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CHINA'S PRAGMATIC SECURITY POLICY: THE 
MIDDLE-POWER FACTOR 
William Tow and Richard Rigby 
The prevailing trend of Chinese foreign policy over the past two decades has been to 
promote an image of China as a cautious and pragmatic great power inclined to adopt 
"soft power" and responsible behavior as the best means to accrue regional and global 
influence. China's smaller regional neighbors have a major stake in whether such a 
China actually emerges. A powerful China that has been conditioned to view 
multilateral institutions as legitimate and effective sources of security may be prepared 
to adopt cooperative positions on regional and global security issues.1 Concerns are 
intensifying, however, that China's leaders are increasingly prone to apply their 
country's growing military and other hard power capabilities as leverage against 
challenges to core Chinese national interests.2 The Chinese leadership's apparent 
adoption of a more aggressive security posture has recently surfaced in relations with 
two of the Asia-Pacific's "middle powers" with whom China has cultivated 
spectacular increases in economic ties and notable advances in political relations: 
Australia and the Republic of Korea (hereafter "South Korea" or "the ROK"). 
Although much has been written about middle powers, there is no consensus 
on what the term actually means. International relations literature generally 
defines "middle powers" as countries which have sufficient material resources 
and diplomatic standing within the international community to exercise leadership 
on key issues relating to international rule-building and rule-adherence, but are 
not "great powers".3 Applying the term to Australia and South Korea and how 
1 As envisioned by Alastair Ian Johnson and Paul Evans, "China and Multilateral Security 
Institutions", in Johnston and Robert S. Ross (eds), Engaging China: The Management of 
an Emerging Power (London: Routledge 1999), pp. 235-72. Also see David M. Lampton, 
"The Faces of Chinese Power", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 1 (January-February 2007), 
pp. 115-27. 
2 US Department of Defense, Military Power of the People's Republic of China Annual Report 
to Congress (Washington: USGPO, 2009) and Greg Sheridan, "Battle of Wills as China 
Seeks to Keep US Military Might at Bay", The Weekend Australian, 14-15 August 2010. 
3 
Among the most prominent treatments of the subject found within the "classical" IR literature 
are Carsten Holbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics (London: Macmillan, 1984); 
Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott and Kim Richard Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: 
Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order (Vancouver: University of British 
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these two states' policy-makers manage their countries' ties with China, however, 
involves more than just acknowledging moderate population levels (Australia has a 
population of approximately 22 million while South Korea's population is 48 million) 
or economic capabilities (in 2009 Australia had the world's B^-largest gross 
domestic product while South Korea ranked 15th).4 
China's significance to Australian and South Korean policy-makers is informed 
by particular historical and strategic factors. Historically, both these countries' 
postwar foreign policies have been largely shaped by efforts to balance their ties 
between their US ally and a China which contends with the United States for 
regional predominance. Initially, Australian and South Korean policy architects 
achieved balance in their relations with China and the US by allying themselves 
with the latter country to contain the expansion of Chinese influence in both 
Northeast and Southeast Asia. More recently, successive Australian and South 
Korean governments have situated themselves as conduits to conjoin China's 
market socialism with an international economic system largely underpinned by 
American-led rules and norms that constitute the so-called "Washington 
consensus".5 Strategically, both countries are test cases as to how well China can 
develop independent and enduring relations with key industrialized Asia-Pacific 
countries unable to rival Chinese power in ways that Japan and India might but 
which maintain substantial security relationships with China's great competitor for 
long-term global influence?the United States. In response, Australia and South 
Korea must now exercise critical policy choices for their own security. 
Any intensification of tensions in Sino-Australian and Sino-South Korean 
relations is unwelcome in both Canberra and Seoul. Successive Australian and 
South Korean governments have spent years pursuing independent and productive 
economic ties with Beijing while adhering to their respective defense alliances with 
the United States. They have done so by being careful not to challenge the vital 
regional security interests of either China or the US in the Asia-Pacific, while 
exercising creativity and flexibility in response to China's "smile diplomacy" 
toward its regional neighbors. Both Australia and the ROK have also contributed 
Columbia Press, 1993); Richard A. Higgott and Kim Richard Nossal, "The Politics of 
Liminality: Relocating Australia in the Asia-Pacific", Australian Journal of Political Science, 
Vol. 32, No. 2 (1997), pp. 169-85; and John Ravenhill, "Cycles of Middle Power Activism: 
Constraint and Choice in Australian and Canadian Foreign Policies", Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol. 52, No. 3 (1998), pp. 309-27. 
4 
See International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2010, 
reproduced at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries by GDP (nominal) (last 
accessed 20 October 2010). 
5 Amitav Acharya has observed that the economic growth of US allies in Asia leading to 
relative US structural power by the late 1990s allowed "middle powers" like Australia, 
Canada, Japan and ASEAN as a group to initiate multilateral institutions and exercise 
substantial regional leadership. South Korea was also substantially involved in such 
initiatives. See Amitav Acharya, "Ideas, Identity and Institution-building: From the 'ASEAN 
Way' to the 'Asia-Pacific Way'?", Pacific Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 (1997), pp. 322-23. 
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judiciously calibrated material resources to the United States' global counter 
terrorism and peace-building efforts in ways that have earned Washington's 
gratitude without precipitating Beijing's wrath. 
Recently, however, both Australia's and South Korea's relations with China 
have revealed differences that could test their relationships. Investigating why 
Sino-Australian and Sino-South Korean relations have recently devolved can be 
useful for understanding the relative strengths and weaknesses of their middle 
power diplomacy. 
The analysis that follows reflects two major factors. First, recent strategic 
thinking in China has undergone a series of complex and at times unanticipated 
adjustments that appear to challenge the "conventional wisdom" which 
international relations theory offers about how great powers contend with middle 
powers over prioritizing national interests. As evidenced by their role in hosting 
the Six-Party Talks on North Korean denuclearization, along with China's 
growing propensity to collaborate with other actors in countering terrorism, piracy 
and other "non-traditional security" threats, Chinese policy-makers have clearly 
developed entrepreneurial postures increasingly compatible with middle-power 
viewpoints. Leadership involving the projection of "soft power" into the regional 
and international communities is gradually becoming a more distinct component 
of Chinese foreign policy.6 
China's current leaders may not have relinquished geopolitical aspirations 
commensurate with ensuring that their country achieves great-power status. 
Intermittent spikes of hyper-sensitivity over issues of sovereignty remain; so does a 
strong sense of Chinese nationalism (as evidenced in both Beijing's lingering 
suspicions over the purpose of American-led bilateral alliances and in its 
increasingly complicated relations with multinational corporations) and conservatism 
(sustained ideological opposition to Western influences and a perpetuation of 
China's formidable military buildup to ensure that it will "never again" be 
subjugated to outside powers). Both of these dynamics underwrite the image of a 
"China threat" rather than of a China ascending via "peaceful development". What is 
clear, however, is that contemporary Chinese policy-makers increasingly legitimize 
reciprocity and mutual respect in their international relations behavior. 
Secondly, middle-power diplomacy exercised by Australia and South Korea 
toward China reflects the trend of systematic bargaining over security issues 
becoming more "normal" in the Asia-Pacific. Throughout the late 1990s and well 
into the first decade of the 21st century, the quest by Chinese leaders to make their 
country an active player in regional multilateralism seemed to validate the worth of 
such diplomacy. As Australia's and South Korea's recent difficulties with China 
have shown, however, it is by no means certain that middle-power diplomacy can, 
by itself, overcome various and ongoing tensions. Such tensions can "spill over" 
to affect region-wide stability and lead to regional states hedging against Chinese 
6 Alan Hunter, "Soft Power: China on the Global Stage", The Chinese Journal of 
International Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Summer 2009), pp. 373-98. 
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power by seeking intensified strategic ties with other external actors (namely, the 
United States). 
Here we conduct a brief review of China's recent strategic thinking to 
understand the context of Australia's and South Korea's policy approaches toward 
the PRC. We will then use case studies to weigh both of these middle powers' 
policies toward China. The two "cases", we argue, concurrently illustrate the 
relative strength of soft-power strategy projected by China's policy-makers 
against their harder-line nationalist instincts. We conclude that excessive Chinese 
policy rigidity would prompt Australian and South Korean policy-makers to 
modify their middle-power diplomacy, and to adopt "hedging strategies" directed 
against China. We deduce, however, that policy-makers in both Australia and 
South Korea are better served by retaining their currently strong interest in 
promoting and assisting China's intensified regional engagement. Indeed, they 
have little other choice if the region is to avoid an intensification of security 
dilemmas and future conflict escalation. 
Chinese Strategic Thinking 
Some Western analysts are convinced that the "rise of China" is synonymous with 
a "China threat". For example, John Mearsheimer, the dean of American neo 
realist scholars, insists that "China will try to push the Americans out of Asia and 
dominate the [Asia-Pacific] region".7 Nationalist Chinese authors likewise 
speculate that Sino-American relations may well be on a collision course. In such 
works as China Can Say No (Zhongguo keyi shuo bu RTlUift^F, published in 
1996) and the more recent Unhappy China (Zhongguo bugaoxing 4*3^ ift^, 
published in early 2009), nationalist Chinese writers suggest that the decline of 
US power is inevitable, and demand that their country should stand up to 
Washington more directly and exert global leadership.8 Various sectors within 
both countries' military establishments identify with this zero-sum interpretation 
of Sino-American geopolitical relations.9 
7 In Zbigniew Brzezinski and John Mearsheimer, "Debate: Clash of the Titans", Foreign 
Policy, Vol. 146 (January/February 2005), p. 50. 
8 See what the editors of China Can Say No say are the main messages of their work in 
Zhang Xiaobo and Song Qiang, "China Can Say No to America", New Perspectives 
Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 4 (1996), p. 55 and reprinted in Daojiong Zha, "Researching 
Chinese Nationalism: The Foreign Relations Dimension", in Pal Nyiri and Joana 
Breidenbach (eds), China Inside Out (Budapest: Central European University Press, 
2005), pp. 64-65. An account of Zhongguo bu gaoxing?da shidai, da mubiao ji women 
de neiyou weihuan (Unhappy China: The Great Time, Grand Vision and Our Challenges) 
is offered by The China Post, 12 April 2009. 
9 Retired Chinese Major General Luo Yuan, writing for the Liberation People's Daily, 
strongly criticized US-South Korea naval exercises scheduled for the Yellow Sea and 
demanded a tough Chinese response, noting that China's "respect" was at stake. Cited by 
Chris Buckley, "China PLA Warns US Over Fresh Military Drill in Region", Reuters, 
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A second and opposing school of Western thought envisions China ascending 
to great-power status without competing with the American-dominated liberal 
international order, and thus largely avoiding strategic competition with the 
United States as the latter's relative power inevitably declines over the first part of 
the 21st century. John Ikenberry has observed that the US-Chinese power 
transition can be very different from past great-power rivalries in international 
relations that resulted in war, both because China faces a multilateral Western 
centric order that is "open, integrated and rules-based with wide and deep political 
foundations" and because it would be precluded from applying force against this 
order in a nuclear era. Accordingly, he concludes that China can gain fizll access 
to and benefit greatly from joining such an order instead of contesting it.10 
Diverging interpretations of what "China's rise" means exist not only in the 
wider international arena but in the Asia-Pacific region as well. An Australian 
defense white paper published in 2009 observed that "the pace, scope and structure 
of China's military modernization have the potential to give its neighbors cause for 
concern if not carefully explained ..."?an observation rejected by both the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry and various Chinese analysts. 
11 
Australian government 
spokespersons, however, subsequently denied that their country's latest defense 
posture was shaped in response to any "China threat theory".12 South Korean policy 
makers have likewise preferred to play down the notion of a "China threat", largely 
due to their hope that China can still exert positive influence on the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to restrain Pyongyang's nuclear aspirations and 
to moderate North Korean behavior. Other policy leaders in the Asia-Pacific have 
also gone to some lengths to deny that their assessments of China are dominated by 
threat perceptions of that country.13 To understand better how Chinese strategy has 
actually evolved, recent doctrinal benchmarks are reviewed below. 
12 August 2010. For official US threat assessments, see Military Power of the People's 
Republic of China, passim. 
10 G. John Ikenberry, "The Rise of China and the Future of the West", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, 
No. 1 (2008), pp. 23-37. 
11 Australian Government, Department of Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific 
Century: Force 2030 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia 2009), www.defence.gov.au/ 
whitepaper/docs/defence white_paper 2009.pdf (accessed 17 May 2009). The Chinese 
response was reported by Zhang Xin in "China's Military Modernization 'No Threat'", 
China Daily, 6 May 2009, www.chinadailv.net/china/2009-05/06/content 7747203.htm 
(accessed 17 May 2009). Also see Shulong Chu and Xiao Ren, China's Peaceful 
Development Doctrine: Views from China, NBR Project Report (Seattle: The National 
Bureau of Asian Research, October 2009). 
12 
Australian Defence Secretary Nick Warner, for example, observed following the Australian 
2009 Defence White Paper's release: "We don't see China as a threat. We see China as an 
opportunity." "China 'Not Concerned by White Paper': Air Chief Marshall Angus 
Houston", The Australian, 7 May 2009. 
13 
See, for example, Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso's speech in Beijing playing down 
prospects of China exerting threatening behavior. See an Agence France Presse report, 
"Aso Calls For Japan, China to Unite", www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ 
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Comprehensive National Power 
Chinese policy analysts are keenly interested in measuring states' relative material 
capabilities as a basis for assessing their own country's "comprehensive national 
power" (zonghe guoli IS Jd). Comprehensive national power or CNP is a 
measurement of how key attributes (both qualitative and quantitative) in a particular 
state compare to those possessed by other major powers in a regional or international 
security system.14 In 1992, China's government adopted the CNP formula as a means 
of focusing on its economic growth which would, it was anticipated in Beijing, 
eventually "spill over" to generate more efficient military modernization and enhance 
China's diplomatic and strategic influence. This strategy intensified in the aftermath 
of 9/11. As a recent Brookings Institution report has noted, "... (w)ith America's 
strategic spotlight focused on counterterrorism ... China perceived a 'period of 
strategic opportunity' izhanlue jiyu qi i$W&#U?$J) in which it could concentrate on 
developing its 'comprehensive national power'".15 No total war involving China 
appeared to be imminent, allowing China's armed forces to be fully integrated 
into the processes of national economic development and the projection of 
Chinese influence abroad. Various Western analysts worry, however, that Chinese 
policy-makers are shifting their thinking about CNP from an approach designed to 
buy China time for achieving economic modernization and avoiding regional conflict 
toward a doctrine justifying China's aggressive pursuit of "core interests" and 
securing its foreign policy goals more rapidly and aggressively, regardless of the risk 
of confronting the United States or other large powers.16 
ALeqM5g kvptVpiTE04vUJb9 MiEMTD4fw (accessed 17 May 2009). Recent intensification 
of the Sino-Japanese territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands, however, may 
well harden Japanese perceptions of a China threat. 
14 How to define CNP is the subject of an ongoing and rigorous debate. For wide-ranging 
assessments of this issue, see Yan Xuetong, "The Rise of China and its Power Status", 
Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2006), pp. 5-33; Samuel S. Kim, 
"China's Path to Great Power Status in the Globalization Era", Asian Perspective, Vol. 27, 
No. 1 (2003), pp. 35-75; Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment 
(Washington: National Defense University Press, January 2000), www.fas.org/nuke/ 
guide/china/doctrine/pills2/ (accessed 18 May 2009); and Karl Hwang, "New Thinking in 
Measuring National Power", Prepared for the WISC Second Global International Studies 
Conference, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, 23-26 July 2008, www.wiscnetwork.org/ 
papers/WISC 2008-137.pdf (accessed 18 May 2009). 
15 See Yuan-Kang Wang, "China's Grand Strategy and US Primacy: Is China Balancing 
American Power?" (Washington: Brookings Institution Center for Northeast Asian 
Policy Studies, July 2006), p. 9, http://209.85.229.132/search?q=cache:adlZuEvvqosJ: 
www.brookings.edu/fp/cnaps/papers/wang2Q06.pdf+China+adopts+Comprehensive+National 
+Power+1992&cd=21 &hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=au (accessed 18 May 2009). Wang was 
quoting a passage from Yang Jiemian, "Zhongyao zhanlue jiyu qi yu Zhongguo waijiao de 
lishi renwu" (Important Period of Strategic Opportunity and the Historical Mission of 
Chinese Diplomacy), Mao Zedong Deng Xiaoping lilun yanjiu (Study of Mao Zedong and 
Deng Xiaoping Theories), No. 4 (2003), pp. 60-67. 
16 John Lee, "China's Rise and the Road to War", The Wall Street Journal, 5 August 2010. 
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Other analysts have regarded China's application of comprehensive national 
power into the region as a "defensive realism-rooted strategy" based on moderation 
and self-restraint. Chinese leaders desire their country to be viewed as a self 
confident and responsible regional actor capable of exercising power without 
simultaneously precipitating fear. They insist, however, on projecting influence 
unconstrained by the desires of other great powers to impose their own will and 
interests against China.17 Developing CNP in a regional context thus entails 
a delicate balancing act: nurturing a sense of regional comfort about Chinese policy 
makers' fundamentally benign intentions by "focusing on incremental capacity 
building, conflict avoidance and stability ..." without allowing China's material and 
ideational vulnerabilities to undermine its efforts to build such a positive image.18 
Australian and South Korean leaders have related positively to CNP as long as 
they perceive it conforming to the second, more defensive-oriented model. 
Economists' speculation about China's growing wealth "supercharging" Australia's 
and South Korea's economies still command far greater attention within those two 
countries' public discourses than do threat perceptions relating to a "China growing 
strong".19 This may change, however, if Chinese policy-makers are viewed as using 
CNP as a basis of justification for Chinese nationalism and hubris or as a means 
to justify China's application of "divide and rule" tactics against Australia's and 
Korea's alliances with the United States.20 
The New Security Concept 
Part of any Chinese balancing strategy to cultivate the growth of power without 
precipitating regional apprehensions entails the realization that even a strong and 
confident Chinese leadership cannot by itself underwrite regional and international 
peace and stability. Over the past decade, Chinese analysts and policy-makers have 
introduced several distinct postures in response to what they view as rapid structural 
change in the Asia-Pacific and in the international system. The most prominent of 
these postures is the "new security concept" (NSC) or xin anquan guandian (Sf$^r 
M &). Various observers differ on precisely when the concept was initially 
formulated and under what context it was introduced or employed. In April 1997, 
17 
Tang Shiping, "The Rise of China as a Security Lynchpin", Asia Times, 21 June 2003, 
http://iaps.cass.cn/English/articles/showcontent.asp?id=393 (accessed 20 May 2009). 
18 
Roy D. Kamphausen and Justin Liang, "PLA Power Projection: Current Realities and 
Emerging Trends", in Michael D. Swaine, Andrew D. Yang and Evan S. Medeiros, with 
Oriana Skylar Mastro (eds), Assessing the Threat: The Chinese Military and Taiwan's 
Security (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007), p. 111. 
19 
Terry McCann, "China Boom Defines Our Future", The Australian, 21 August 2010, and 
Sunny Lee, "Korea's Future Lies with China?Economically", The Korea Times, 27 June 
2010. 
20 An example of Chinese polemics which could be interpreted as doing just this is an editorial, 
"US Must Not Try to Check China's Rising Power", appearing in Renmin ribao (People's 
Daily), English on-line edition, 17 August 2010 at http://english.peopledailv.com.cn/ 
90001/90780/91342/7107279.html (accessed 21 August 2010). 
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Chinese diplomats applied the NSC's principles when signing The Agreement on 
Confidence Building Measures in Military Fields along the Border Areas and 
The Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces along the Border Areas 
with Russia and those Central Asian states constituting the "Shanghai Five" (later 
renamed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization). In December 1997, Chinese 
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen promoted the concept to an ASEAN meeting 
celebrating that organization's 30th anniversary. Three months later (February 1998) 
Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian called for its adoption by Asia-Pacific 
regional security actors.21 
A broad consensus exists, however, that a definitive July 1998 white paper 
issued by the Information Office of China's State Council represented the first 
instance where the NSC was systematically and comprehensively developed. 
The white paper's basic argument was that the "Cold War mentality" and, by 
implication, those alliance arrangements which underwrote its perpetuation, needed to 
be supplanted by less confrontational approaches to security politics. These included 
"dialogue, consultation and negotiation" designed to generate a "fair and reasonable 
new international order".22 The 2002 version of this doctrine was presented to the 
Sixteenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The essence of NSC was 
designated as cooperation on the basis of the UN Charter and the "Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence": achieving dispute resolution through peaceful means; 
strengthening international economic and financial organizations; emphasizing non 
traditional security areas as well as more traditional security sectors and conducting 
effective disarmament and arms control policy.23 
China promoted the NSC at a time when successive Australian and South 
Korean governments were exploring options for establishing more comprehensive 
Northeast Asian multilateral security frameworks emanating from the Six-Party 
Talks or other regional dialogues. Policy interest-convergence between the three 
countries in exploring soft-power processes and mechanisms for establishing and 
underwriting these frameworks was clearly evident. Less clear, however, was how 
middle powers such as Australia and South Korea, both with long-standing 
alliance ties to the United States, would manage the "harder edge" of the NSC 
21 Zhu Mingquan, "Beyond Westphalia and New Security Concepts", GIS Working Paper (Hong 
Kong Baptist University), No. 6 (March 2005), www.irchina.org/en/news/view.asp?id=340 
(accessed 16 June 2009). 
22 "China to Continue to Pursue New Security Concept for World Peace", People's Daily, 
27 December 2004, http://english.peopledailv.com.cn/200412/27/eng20041227 168809.html 
(accessed 16 June 2009). Authoritative accounts published in the West include Bates Gill, 
Rising Star: China's New Security Diplomacy (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 
2007), especially pp. 1-20, and Denny Roy, "China's Pitch for a Multipolar World: The New 
Security Concept", Asia-Pacific Security Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2003), www.apcss.org/ 
Publications/APSSS/ChinasPitchforaMultipolarWorld.pdf (accessed 16 June 2009). 23 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "China's Position Paper on 
the New Security Concept", 31 July 2002, www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/gjs/gjzzyhy/ 
2612/2614/tl5319.htm (accessed 16 June 2009). 
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raison-d'etre?that postwar, American-led alliance systems were outmoded and 
regionally destabilizing. This component of the NSC proved to be a major 
impediment to Chinese leaders' efforts to induce their Australian and South 
Korean counterparts to accept this particular recipe for building regional security 
architectures. 
Making the Transition to a "Harmonious World" 
Following 9/11, Chinese policy-makers and analysts became more confident 
about China's place in the world as their US counterparts became increasingly 
preoccupied with neutralizing international terrorism. The ensuing diffusion of 
American power led to what China's leadership viewed as a more "democratized" 
international order encouraging global peace and development.24 
Just over a year after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and on the Pentagon, 
Zheng Bijian, a CCP theoretician and a confidant of Chinese President Hu Jintao, led 
a delegation to the United States to ascertain the Bush administration's outlook 
toward his country. He concluded that American apprehension over China's long 
term strategic intentions was sufficiently great to warrant developing a new theory 
espousing China's "peaceful rise".25 Zheng presented his thoughts at the November 
2003 Boao Forum, emphasizing China's prioritization of economic reform and 
political liberalization, the fostering of appreciation for Chinese civilization and the 
advance of regional security through conflict avoidance and regional cooperation. 
Hu Jintao endorsed Zheng's research, and by the middle of2004 China's Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs began to lobby for "peaceful rise" to be repackaged as "peaceful 
development"?a more "politically correct" term to describe the same process of 
China taking its place as an economically powerful but non-threatening actor on the 
world stage.26 Underlying this nuanced change in the Chinese strategic outlook was 
what one Chinese scholar has aptly characterized as a grand strategy adjusted from 
projecting a "philosophy of struggle" to a "philosophy of harmony".27 This shift 
resulted in the Sixth Plenum of the CCP's Central Committee (convened in October 
2006) embracing the notion of a "harmonious world" (hexie shijie ^Oi^ttt^-). 
24 Bates Gill, "China's Evolving Regional Security Strategy", in David Shambaugh (ed.), 
Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2005), p. 251. This Chinese interpretation was particularly evident in its 2004 Defense 
White Paper. 
25 Xiao Ren, "A Rising China Sees Itself in Asia's Mirror", in Shulong Chu and Xiao Ren 
(eds), China's Peaceful Development Doctrine, NBR Project Report (Washington: 
National Bureau of Asian Research, October 2009), p. 11. 
26 Bonnie S. Glaser and Evan S. Medeiros, "The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy-Making 
in China: The Ascension and Demise of the Theory of 'Peaceful Rise'", The China 
Quarterly, No. 190 (June 2007), pp. 295-98, 301-09, and Xiao Ren, "A Rising China", p. 11. 
27 Yuan Peng, "Sino-American Relations: New Changes and New Challenges", Australian 
Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 1 (2007), p. 107. 
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From the perspective of those officials shaping policy in "regional middle powers" 
such as Australia and South Korea?countries that had long-standing security ties with 
the US but feared being "caught between" their traditional American strategic 
guarantor and an increasingly vital Chinese trading partner?Hu's harmonious world 
doctrine could certainly be interpreted positively. Indeed, that doctrine suggested 
a more pragmatic Chinese tolerance toward US bilateral alliances in general, even if 
Chinese and American views on regional and world order-building still encompassed 
various differences.28 A review of how well China's evolving diplomacy has worked 
with Australia and South Korea provides a useful basis for this judgement. 
Sino-Australian Relations: An Ambiguous but Critical Partnership 
Reminiscing in late 2002, 30 years after he was central to normalizing Sino 
Australian relations, former Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam predicted 
that the "China-Australia relationship will dominate our [Australia's] world 
stance for the next half century".29 Whether Australia's relations with China have 
gained that level of intensity is debatable, but China's growing centrality as a force 
in Australian foreign policy is beyond dispute. Australia's potential significance to 
China as an increasingly significant "middle power" relates to its growing 
importance as a regional trading partner (and particularly as a commodities supplier 
to China's rapidly growing economy), its ability and willingness to serve as 
an occasional interlocutor or "bridge-building" agent in translating Chinese regional 
interests to its American ally and its efforts to play a leading role in shaping Asia 
Pacific order-building. Australia has clearly enhanced its significance as a middle 
power actor in the first policy sector, has experienced some progress in the second 
but has been less successful in the third. 
Recent trends in the two countries' bilateral economic relations underscore the first 
point. According to recent data compiled by Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (DFAT), China is Australia's second-largest trading partner. In 2008 it 
accounted for 15.1 per cent of Australia's total trade volume (nearly AU$68 billion? 
28.3 per cent over the previous year). Australia, in turn, is China's sixth-largest source 
of imports and constitutes China's lS^-largest export market. Iron ore, wool and 
copper top the list of Australian commodities of demand in China, while Australian 
demand for Chinese clothing, telecommunications equipment and computers has 
intensified. Education is Australia's largest service export to the PRC, with 127,000 
Chinese students enrolled in 2008, an increase of nearly 20 per cent over the previous 
year, producing A$3.1 billion in revenue for Australia's economy. Investment 
growth has been less spectacular than trade expansion, but China still ranks as 
Australia's 17th-largest investor (A$6.2 billion in 2008).30 Despite recent setbacks 
28 Yuan Peng, "Sino-American Relations: New Changes and New Challenges". 
29 
Gough Whitlam, "Sino-Australian Diplomatic Relations, 1972-2002", Australian Journal 
of International Affairs, Vol. 56, No. 3 (2002), p. 323. 
30 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "People's Republic of 
China Country Brief?April 2009", www.dfat.gov.au/GEO/china/cb index.html (accessed 
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for Chinese investment firms seeking a larger share in the resource sector, Australia 
remains a reliable and stable supplier to China, with none of the political risk attendant 
on supply from other possible sources. Economic interdependence has become a major 
characteristic defining the Sino-Australian relationship. 
Given this solid economic foundation, the overall outlook for Sino-Australian 
relations remains bright. Australia's two previous prime ministers?John Howard 
and Kevin Rudd?were both at the forefront in insisting that the outlooks of the 
United States and China toward one another were increasingly compatible?that 
Australia, as a long-practicing middle power, could engage both of these great 
powers on a range of regional and multilateral issues. This conviction was evident 
in an address which Rudd delivered to the Brookings Institution in late March 
2008, in which he focused on the potential compatibility of the American 
"responsible stakeholder" thesis and China's "harmonious world" doctrine.31 
Recent Australian governments have thus been seeking to overcome a long 
standing "Australian nightmare" of being caught in a future conflict between its 
traditional American security ally and its rapidly growing Chinese economic 
partner, by adopting a typical middle-power diplomatic stance: pursuing conflict 
avoidance by promoting adherence to collective security and by mediating great 
power interests.32 Rudd's proposal to explore ways to forge an "Asia-Pacific 
Community" (APC) in June 2008 was indicative of this.33 The Australian Prime 
Minister envisioned the APC as a way to build an institutional structure that 
would allow for comprehensive engagement of both China and the United States 
across the full range of security and economic agendas. He was fully aware, 
however, that his proposal stood no chance of gaining regional support unless the 
Chinese publicly endorsed the spirit of the initiative. As will be explained below, 
Chinese policy-makers have done so, but only in a very qualified way. 
On the way to promoting this version of a new Asia-Pacific order, however, the 
Rudd government confronted several unexpected obstructions in the China 
relationship. One was the escalation of attempts by Chinese multinational commercial 
interests to acquire greater shares of Australia's resource sector. Over the first part of 
2009, the Aluminum Company of China (Chinalco) unsuccessfully bid to increase its 
shareholding in Rio Tinto?the world's third-largest mining company? from 9.3 per 
cent (purchased in 2008) to 18.5 per cent. China's Hunan Valin Iron and Steel 
Corporation was more successful, acquiring about 18 per cent of the shares in 
21 June 2009); and Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
"China Fact Sheet", www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/chin.pdf (accessed 21 June 2009). 
31 Prime Minister of Australia, "The Australia-US Alliance and Emerging Challenges in the 
Asia-Pacific Region", Brookings Institution, Washington, 31 March 2008, www.pm.gov.au/ 
media/Speech/2008/speech 0157.cfm (accessed 21 June 2009). 
32 Carl Ungerer, "Spit and Polish for Middle Power", Sydney Morning Herald, 28 March 2008. 
33 The Hon. Kevin Rudd MP, Prime Minister of Australia, "It's Time to Build an Asia Pacific 
Community", Address to the Asia Society AustralAsia Centre, Sydney, 4 June 2008, 
www.asiasociety.org/resources/080604 australia dinner speech.pdf (accessed 20 June 2009). 
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Fortescue Metals Group. The most tense resources sector acquisition episode, 
however, was the Rudd government's rejection (on national security grounds) of China 
Minmetals' original bid to buy Oz Minerals and, more specifically, the latter's mine at 
Prominent Hill in South Australia. The Australian Department of Defence objected to 
the sale because of the mine's proximity to the Woomera weapons testing range and, 
reportedly, due to its concerns that China could use the site to intercept satellite 
transmissions to the joint Australia-US intelligence installation at Pine Gap, 600 
kilometers further north.34 (A restructured bid taking this objection into account was 
subsequently approved.) Rudd was also not helped by disclosures that his Defence 
Minister had close and controversial ties with a Chinese businesswoman and that he 
had hosted China's propaganda minister at an unannounced meeting in his residence 
just prior to Rudd being christened "China's roving ambassador". In early July 2009, 
Stern Hu, an executive with Rio Tinto, was arrested with several of his Chinese 
colleagues in Shanghai and subsequently charged with receiving bribes and obtaining 
commercial secrets from Chinese iron ore firms. The following month, the Chinese 
government strongly protested against the visit of exiled Uyghur leader Rebiya Kadeer 
to the Melbourne Film Festival, and Chinese computer hackers allegedly attacked that 
event's website. One prominent Australian security analyst aptly summarized these 
underlying patterns of disquiet that threatened to undermine Australia's commercial 
relationships: "The momentum has shifted [in Australia] from being broadly receptive 
to these deals to having a hard think ... This is not just about China and Australia. 
It's about how the world sees China playing its role in the future as a great power."35 
This mixed record of Sino-Australian investment relations was indicative of 
a larger trend of unease emerging within the Australian electorate about the Chinese 
government's long-term geopolitical intentions. Perhaps the most significant 
Australian strategic assessment of China's hard power was its release of a new 
defense white paper in May 2009. Over the reported objections of Australia's Office 
of National Assessments and Defence Intelligence Organisation, that document 
(released by Australia's Defence Department) announced the implementation of a 
major Australian defense buildup over the next two decades, largely justified as a 
necessary response to the unbridled growth of military power in Asia.36 Taken in toto, 
the white paper is ambiguous on its overall assessment of the defense implications of 
China's rise. Concluding that "the pace, scope and structure of China's military 
modernization have the potential to give its neighbors cause for concern if not 
carefully explained", Australian defense planners called for a strengthening of then 
own country's air and maritime naval forces to levels sufficient to hedge against 
the emergence of future regional adversaries operating in Australia's own 
34 Cameron Stewart, "Block on Chinese Mining Bid 'Linked to Pine Gap'", The 
Australian, 2 April 2009. 
35 Observed by Alan Dupont and quoted in "Uneasy Engagement?Australia, Nourishing 
China's Economic Engine, Questions Ties", New York Times, 2 June 2009. 
36 Cameron Stewart and Patrick Walters, "Spy Chiefs Cross Swords Over China as Kevin 
Rudd Backs Defence Hawks", The Australian, 11 April 2009. 
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neighborhood.37 Given Australia's recent close defense cooperation with such 
ASEAN states as Indonesia, Japan and South Korea, it would be reasonable for 
independent observers to conclude that China was the country which these planners 
had most in mind. In subsequent commentary, however, high-level defense figures 
were at pains to stress that they did not regard China as an explicit threat. At the same 
time, China's response to Australia's defense white paper was noticeably measured, 
with a Foreign Ministry spokesman telling Australian journalists that "[We hope] 
neighboring countries will view China's military buildup objectively, without bias".38 
Yet observers could reasonably surmise that the Rudd government's middle-power 
diplomacy was susceptible to modification by those ready to apply worst-case 
analyses to Chinese intentions and capabilities. This was reinforced by the results of a 
Lowy Institute poll in late May 2010 which indicated that almost half of the 
Australian public (47 per cent) believed that China would emerge as a military threat 
to Australia within two decades (up from 42 per cent in a similar 2009 poll).39 
In this context, it is important to recall briefly the middle-power diplomacy 
toward the PRC and regional security applied by Rudd's predecessor, John Howard. 
The Howard government was hardly a champion of multilateral approaches to 
regional security, preferring instead to rely upon the ANZUS alliance with the United 
States as Australia's ultimate security guarantee. It did, however, seek membership of 
and participation in regional forums to enable Australia to enhance its influence in a 
region where traditionally it was often marginalized, as a Western power located in a 
non-Western setting. To this degree, at least, Howard pursued the classical middle 
power diplomatic strategy of carefully identifying a prospect for establishing a 
specific niche or identity as a regional player and earmarking necessary resources to 
maximize that opportunity.40 By orienting the sale of Australian natural resources and 
overall trade policy toward strengthening bilateral ties with China, however, Howard 
was able to carve an Australian niche of economic links with the PRC, despite its 
unique bilateral security relationship with the US. 
Australia's decision to seek membership in the East Asian Summit (EAS) became 
a key test case for this strategy's credibility. It emanated from negotiations within 
the so-called "ASEAN+3" (ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea) or APT 
37 See Australian Government, Department of Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific 
Century: Force 2030 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2009), www.defence.gov.au/ 
whitepaper/docs/defence whitejraper 2009.pdf (accessed 22 June 2009). 
38 Michael Sainsbury and Cameron Stewart, "China a 'Peace Force' in Beijing's Response to 
Defence Paper", The Australian, 6 May 2009. Also see "FM: China's Military 
Modernization Poses No Threat to Other Countries", China Daily (online), 5 May 2009, 
accessed 31 October 2010. 
39 
Fergus Hanson, Australia and the World: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (Sydney: The 
Lowy Institute, 2009), p. 11. 
40 
Although backing the controversial proposition that Howard was an enthusiastic 
bilateralist entertaining an unswerving preference for dealing with Washington on regional 
security issues, Bruce Grant outlines this middle power strategy in clear terms. See Bruce 
Grant, "Australia Playing the Power Game", The Age (Melbourne), 18 April 2008. 
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to neutralize the impact of global financial institutions such as the International 
Monetary Fund. The EAS was initially designed to be an instrument for applying a 
comparatively "exclusivist" brand of Asian regionalism in regional institution 
building.41 Howard initially resisted joining the EAS on the terms demanded by its 
core members (adherence to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation or "TAC" that 
might compromise Australia's involvement with the United States' extended nuclear 
deterrence posture). Various APT member-states (Japan, Indonesia and Singapore) 
succeeded in their campaign to allow "exceptions" that accommodated their own 
security relations with the US to be applied to Australia's ratification of TAC. They 
did so as a maneuver to prevent what they regarded as the threat of Chinese 
domination of EAS if the exclusivist model prevailed42 Determined not to alienate 
ASEAN, Chinese diplomats acquiesced on the EAS membership issue. They did so, 
however, insisting that the APT?a grouping in which neither Australia nor its 
American ally were members?should be the "main framework" for community 
building, while the EAS should be a less formal mechanism facilitating dialogue and 
a general spirit of regional cooperation.43 
The Chinese government has remained consistent in its support of the more 
exclusivist APT as the best model for regional order-building. In a late October 
2009 visit to Australia, China's Vice Premier Li Keqiang acceded to a joint 
statement in which China noted that it "welcomes Australia's Asia-Pacific 
community initiative".44 Endorsing the APC at this juncture, however, cost 
Beijing nothing because it was treated as a regional security concept up for 
discussion rather than a formal structural initiative (which, indeed, is how Rudd 
presented it). In advancing the APT as their preferred institution, China's leaders 
insist that the APT should be "the main channel for East Asian cooperation", 
excluding "Western values of democracy, freedom and human rights".45 
41 
Background on this development is provided by Akihiko Tanaka, "The Development of the 
ASEAN+3 Framework", in Melissa Curley and Nicholas Thomas (eds), Advancing East 
Asian Regionalism (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 52-73. 
42 A concise but thorough account of these events is offered by the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, Strategic Comments, Vol. 11, No. 10 (2005), www.iiss.org/publications/ 
strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-11 -2005/volume-11 ?issue-10/the-east-asia-summit/ 
(accessed 22 June 2009). 
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This brief survey of recent trends in Sino-Australian relations supports our 
argument that Australian middle-power diplomacy can be regarded as generally 
successful in the economic policy sector but less so in the diplomatic and geopolitical 
arenas. Australia has become a key economic partner for China and the spectacular 
growth of Chinese foreign direct investment in Australia (growing at more than 
60 per cent per annum) reflects an intensifying, if at times thorny, bilateral commercial 
relationship.46 This trend should continue under future Australian governments despite 
intermittent bilateral commercial tensions. Chinese leaders appear to have been more 
qualified in supporting Canberra's efforts to portray itself as a middle-power "honest 
broker" in regional "high politics". Australian apprehensions over growing Chinese 
military power, such as those expressed by Australian Foreign Minister Stephen Smith 
during the July-August 2010 Australian Federal Election campaign and Sino 
Australian differences over such issues as human rights and regional "order-building" 
act to constrain Chinese acceptance of Australia as China's natural strategic partner in 
the region.47 Australian policy-makers' attempts to establish their country as a 
"different" type of middle power, successfully able to adjudicate both economic and 
strategic relations between contending great powers, have thus been only partially 
successful. Reports emerged in the Chinese press during late August 2010 that 
speculated that China's leaders viewed the Gillard government (Rudd was deposed as 
Prime Minister by his own Labor Party in late June 2010) as a potential mediator 
between China and the US and between China and ASEAN in the South China Sea. 
If true, Australia's middle-power role in geopolitics might broaden over time.48 
It seems improbable, however, that the US would rely on its junior ally to arbitrate 
Washington's own relations with Beijing or that ASEAN states would accept Canberra 
brokering their territorial disputes with the Chinese. 
Sino-Australian relations have reached an important crossroads. Chinese policy 
makers' soft-power approaches have been successful in allowing them to cultivate 
a growing and mutually beneficial economic relationship with Australia. Such 
approaches have been proven to be less effective in restricting Chinese or Australian 
nationalism from exerting a negative impact on various cultural, political and 
strategic issues that have emerged in that bilateral relationship. Recent Australian 
governments' policies toward balancing Chinese interests with its own have likewise 
produced mixed results. The Rudd government's ambitious regional security 
agendas were not always matched by adequate policy consistency towards China. 
46 Frank Tudor, "Stocktake of the Sino-Australia Relationship", East Asia Forum, 16 February 
2010 at http://www.eastasiafomm.org/2010/02/16/stocktake-of-me 
(accessed 26 May 2010). 
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Former Australian ambassador to China, Stephen F. FitzGerald, has labeled this 
condition a "puzzle" in Australian foreign policy?the lack of a strong narrative 
about where Australia is specifically going in its relations with China, one that can 
readily be separated from ad hoc policy responses largely shaped by short-term 
domestic public opinion.49 However, recent moves by both the Chinese and 
Australian governments to initiate more systematic and regular dialogue, most 
notably via the Joint Declaration released during Li Keqiang's October 2009 visit to 
Australia and via the establishment of a "high level forum" of business, political and 
education leaders from both countries during Vice President Xi Jinping's visit to 
Australia in June 2010, provide a basis for optimism about the future.50 
China and South Korea: Engagement or Balancing? 
Like their Australian counterparts, recent South Korean governments can be 
viewed as trying to implement effective middle-power relations with China. Their 
motives for pursuing this role, however, differ from those adopted by Australian 
policy-makers. Australia is a distant country, intent on overcoming its legacy of 
historical and cultural marginalization in East Asia, and harbors no permanently 
stationed foreign combat forces on its territory. By contrast, the ROK is located at 
the juncture between Northeast Asia's great-power rivals. It confronts a hostile 
and nuclear-armed rival Korean state to its immediate north, and still hosts a 
substantial US military presence on its soil. The sheer volatility of its geographic 
and strategic circumstances has driven a succession of recent South Korean 
leaders to ensure their country's survival through creative diplomacy rather than 
by complete reliance on the US alliance. 
This South Korean posture involves pursuing a dual strategy toward China. 
Seoul has strengthened its engagement with the PRC in the expectation that the 
spectacular growth in PRC-ROK economic relations will continue and with the 
hope that the PRC will facilitate security negotiations between North and South 
Korea. In this context, South Korea's leadership has not always deferred to its 
senior US ally in searching for greater stability in Northeast Asia, but has pursued 
more independent agendas when it believed that North Korea's government 
would be susceptible to influence by the application of diplomacy rather than 
containment. It has simultaneously, however, hedged or balanced against rising 
Chinese power by sustaining its alliance with the United States, and has closed 
ranks with Washington during those occasions when Kim Jong-il's North Korean 
regime has appeared to be particularly belligerent and less likely to be restrained 
49 
Stephen F. FitzGerald, "Learning to Live with China: Stern Hu, Kevin Rudd, Governance and 
China Policy ... What China Policy?", Address to the Australian Institute for International 
Affairs, NSW, 25 August 2009, at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/ 
09/Learning%20to%20Live%20with%20China.pdf (accessed 26 January 2010). 
50 A text of the Joint Statement is at http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/joint statement 
091030.html (accessed 26 January 2010). During his trip, Xi signed agreements for Sino 
Australian collaboration in the mining sector worth approximately AU$10 billion. 
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by Chinese diplomacy.51 During the crisis that erupted following the sinking, 
allegedly by North Korea, of a South Korean corvette (the Cheonan) in March 
2010, South Korean President Lee Myong-bak and his government relied on that 
alliance as insurance, while simultaneously projecting highly assertive diplomacy 
toward China to support South Korea's economic and diplomatic reprisals against 
North Korea. China's response as of this writing has been sufficiently cautious to 
generate disappointment among South Korea's leaders. When visiting Seoul at the 
end of May, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stated that China would make a judgment 
in an "objective and fair manner and take its stance on the basis of facts regarding 
the sinking of the warship". China would not, however, undermine peace and 
stability on the Korean peninsula over attributing direct blame to North Korea nor 
did it condone a series of upgraded US-ROK military exercises intended to 
convince the North to behave less belligerently.52 
The patterns of South Korean middle-power behavior took hold prior to the 
end of the Cold War. South Korean President Roh Tae-woo embraced Nordpolitik 
during the 1980s, reaching out to the USSR and China to bolster his country's 
trade ties with those two great powers and to isolate North Korea diplomatically 
from its traditional Soviet and Chinese allies. This opened the door for what has 
become a remarkable surge in bilateral Sino-South Korean trade relations: South 
Korean exports to China surged from just short of US$12 billion in 1998 to nearly 
US$82 billion in 2007 (China became the ROK's leading trade partner in 2004) 
while the ROK imported around US$63 billion worth of Chinese goods in 2007.53 
Kim Dae-jung subsequently adopted a so-called "Sunshine Policy" designed to 
bypass great-power competition in Northeast Asia and to forge closer direct links 
with the DPRK. He also established South Korea's credentials as a leader in 
regional institution-building by initiating the East Asian Vision Group that 
provided the framework for the EAS, while simultaneously playing a key role in 
the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping.54 
Kim's successor, Roh Myun-hyun, sought to establish South Korea's independent 
diplomatic credentials relative to its traditional US ally by creating the Presidential 
Commission on Northeast Asian Cooperation, and in 2005 unsuccessfully proposed 
that South Korea "mediate" Sino-Japanese tensions. He also introduced the 
"national integration over security alliance formula" that underscored conciliation 
51 Sukhee Han, "From Engagement to Hedging: South Korea's New China Policy", The 
Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 20, No. 4 (December 2008), pp. 335-51. 
52 "Wen Urges Diplomacy Over S. Korean Warship Sinking", Xinhua, 31 May 2010, at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/photo/2010-05/31 /c 13 324864.htm (accessed 
1 June 2010). 
53 Sukhee Han, "From Engagement to Hedging", p. 340. South Korea maintains a substantial 
trade surplus with the PRC which was approximately US$32.5 billion in 2009. See "S. Korea 
Posts Record-high Trade Surplus in 2009", China Economic Net, 14 January 2010, at 
http://en.ce.cn/WorlQ7biz/201001/14/t20100114 20800769.shtml (accessed 30 January 2010). 
54 Kim Dae-jung, "Regionalism in the Age of Asia", Global Asia, No. 1 (Fall 2006), p. 11. 
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and appeasement over containment and confrontation with North Korea.55 To gain 
credibility for his effort to reach out to Beijing, Roh requested?and received?the 
assistance of China (as North Korea's only strategic ally) in conditioning Pyongyang 
to engage in multilateral negotiations directed toward ending North Korea's nuclear 
weapons development program. Despite this assistance and notwithstanding an 
ongoing explosion in Sino-South Korean trade relations, Roh understood that 
maintaining the US alliance was still required if Seoul was to exercise strategic 
leverage between China and Japan and project leadership in Northeast Asia's order 
building while inter-Korean tensions remained unresolved.56 
Critics who labeled Roh's efforts to launch his country's China-centric middle 
power diplomacy a "total disaster" because these efforts were seen as geared toward 
diluting American influence in the region were thus off the mark.57 A more reasonable 
assessment is that the South Korean president was responding to changing trends in 
domestic public opinion favoring a more independent Korean foreign policy and 
exploiting mutual Chinese-South Korean interest in a non-nuclear Korean peninsula.58 
China's government was indeed active in exercising leadership on the North Korean 
nuclear crisis. It provided sufficient economic assistance to keep the North Korean 
regime from imploding. Simultaneously, it also worked with South Korea and the 
United States to defuse tensions on the peninsula in ways that would solidify long-term 
Chinese influence with both Koreas. "The net result", as Robert Sutter has since 
recalled, "was a marked increase in China's relations with South Korea, and continued 
Chinese relations with North Korea, closer than any other power, without negatively 
55 Scott Snyder, "Prospects for a Northeast Asia Security Framework", Paper prepared for 
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affecting Beijing's relations with the United States".59 Roh's successor, current South 
Korean president Lee Myung-bak, has continued to pursue this policy course by 
cultivating a deliberately ambiguous "strategic cooperative relationship" with China 
while pursuing an alliance with the United States based on partnership rather than US 
strategic hierarchy. Lee's inherent conservatism, however, should not be interpreted as a 
lack of pragmatism. South Korea's efforts to strengthen its ties with China in both the 
economic and diplomatic arenas have proceeded apace. An annual China-Japan-South 
Korea Trilateral Summit involving consultations between the three countries leaders on 
key economic and diplomatic issues is particularly significant.60 The growing scope of 
those relations may have had influence on the Chinese government not folly backing its 
long-standing North Korean ally in the aftermath of the Cheonan investigation. 
Using a revived American alliance (which had become noticeably more strained 
by the Bush administration's suspicions over the relatively independent initiatives 
toward North Korea of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo-hyun) as a backdrop, Lee has 
felt confident about raising his country's profile within the ASEAN+3 and the 
increasingly significant Trilateral Summit Meetings convened between China, 
Japan and South Korea. The latter forum has evolved into an important vehicle for 
China to discuss (and tacitly support) Lee's proposed "grand bargain" for North 
Korea to relinquish its nuclear weapons program in return for aid and security 
guarantees.61 Chinese preference for a region-centric approach to North Korean 
nuclear disarmament, however, potentially marginalizes Washington on this issue. 
It thus presents Lee with the diplomatic imperative to balance China's already 
primary role in North Korean nuclear negotiations against the United States' 
skepticism about any agreement reached without adequate US participation and 
in the absence of a North Korean accountability mechanism sufficient to ensure that 
it adheres to its end of any bargain reached. Nevertheless, by working through the 
APT and highlighting the value of "summit diplomacy" South Korea, like 
Australia, remains keen to utilize middle-power diplomacy to encourage China to 
be "socialized" into accepting regional institutionalization and regime-building. 
Although recent Chinese and South Korean governments have clearly realized 
greater cordiality and profit in their countries' bilateral relationship, their bilateral 
ties have still experienced intermittent tensions emanating from history and 
territorial identity. Lee Myung-bak's emphasis on maintaining a close security 
alliance with the United States was not received well by Beijing's leadership 
59 Robert G. Sutter, China's Rise in Asia (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), p. 156. 
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when China was risking its own geopolitical credibility by conditioning North 
Korea to participate in multilateral negotiations.62 This may at least partly explain 
the Chinese government's initial reluctance to distance itself from North Korea in 
the immediate aftermath of the investigation which blamed the North for the 
Cheonan incident. In 2004, moreover, a controversy erupted between the two 
countries over the historical interpretation of the Koguryo Dynasty that ruled parts 
of what are now Northeast China and North Korea from 33 BC to 668 AD. China's 
"Northeast Asia" project (underwritten by Chinese government funding) attempts to 
portray this regime as a Chinese provincial state, rather than an independent Korean 
kingdom. This aggravated sovereign sensitivities on both sides. Subsequent 
diplomatic efforts defused the incident, but neither the problems of historical 
interpretation nor of lingering South Korean suspicion of Chinese territorial 
ambitions were completely resolved.63 Such episodes have convinced both South 
Korea's leaders and its populace that moving closer to China too soon would be 
inappropriate. It is notable that polling of South Korea's public opinion of the PRC 
reflects a decline of favorable attitudes from 52 per cent in 2007 to only 41 per cent 
in late 2009.64 Over the short term, South Korea is more likely to continue 
projecting a mixture of engagement, balancing and hedging tactics toward the PRC, 
under the umbrella of the American alliance.65 
As is the case with the Sino-Australian relationship, South Korea's middle 
power behavior has been shaped by China's shift in economic and geopolitical 
status. Previously, China was viewed by successive South Korean governments as a 
third party or buffer which could be used to assert the ROK's greater politico 
strategic independence vis-a-vis the United States and its value to China as an 
economic partner, thereby conditioning the PRC?North Korea's only true strategic 
partner?to exercise a more evenhanded posture toward the two Koreas. Like 
Australia, however, the current South Korean government has discovered that 
Chinese power has become increasingly critical to shaping its own country's future 
economic and geopolitical destiny. As China's leverage intensifies in addressing 
62 See Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Australia, "Foreign Ministry 
Spokesperson Qin Gang's Regular Press Conference on 27 May 2008", at http://au.chma 
embassv.org/eng/fvrth/t459519.htm (accessed 31 January 2008). Qin insisted that "the US 
ROK military alliance is something left over from the history ... The Cold War mentality 
of 'military alliance' would not be valid in viewing, measuring and handling the current 
global or regional security issues." 
63 Jae Ho Chung, "China's 'Soft' Clash With South Korea", Asian Survey, Vol. 49, No. 3 
(May-June 2009), pp. 468-83. 
64 Andrew Kohut, President, Pew Research Center, "How the World Sees China", 11 December 
2007, at http://pewresearch.org/pubs/656/how-the-world-sees-china and Pew Research 
Center, "Chart of Opinion of China in 2009?Pew Global Attitudes Project?Key Indicators 
Data Base", at http://pewglobal.org/database/7indicatorf4 (both accessed 1 June 2010). 
65 
Chung-in Moon, "Caught in the Middle: Obama and the ROK", East Asian Forum, 22 January 
2009, at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/01/22/caught-in-the-middle-obama-and 
the-rok/#more-1415 (accessed 31 January 2009). 
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intra-Korean tensions and in shaping the world economy, South Korean policy 
makers will find exercising "classical" middle-power diplomacy?taking the lead 
on defining and shaping how selected economic and diplomatic issues are viewed 
and implemented in international relations?increasingly difficult. South Korea's 
economic prosperity remains its greatest (and perhaps its only) real asset in 
influencing Chinese policy interests. 
Conclusion 
Australia's and South Korea's applications of middle-power diplomacy suggest that 
these stalwart American regional allies are becoming reconciled to a future Asia 
Pacific regional security order that will become increasingly multipolar in character, 
with China playing an increasingly vital role. The shaping of a Sino-American 
condominium in some form that is diplomatically acceptable to the wider region 
is preferable to regional anarchy where the management of outstanding security 
problems becomes impossible and a US-China strategic confrontation occurs. 
Chinese policy-makers' ability to relate effectively to Australia and South Korea as 
middle powers that are nevertheless still supported by viable US extended deterrence 
guarantees will go far to demonstrate how effective it will be in conducting the 
business of "responsible" great-power politics. 
In this context, the Cheonan ship sinking incident looms as a major test case, as 
Chinese policy-makers search to calibrate the seemingly countervailing objectives 
of addressing and assuaging South Koreans' rage over the sinking of their naval 
vessel, while still preserving a North Korean buffer state that they regard as 
a geopolitical imperative. While China's foreign policy outlooks have become more 
compatible with the objectives of "middle-power diplomacy" pursued by Australia 
and South Korea, Chinese policy-makers need to pursue opportunities for further 
policy convergence. Their failure to do so could push the Australian and South 
Korean governments to "harden" their traditional security links with the United 
States in ways detrimental to long-term Chinese regional interests and influence. 
As China develops into a more formidable and self-confident security actor, 
Chinese policy-makers may well consider the advantages of compromising on 
middle-power issues in regard to their country's sovereign and territorial interests 
that they have traditionally viewed as sacrosanct. There are signs that such a shift 
is already under way, as China's leaders begin to absorb the implications of 
risking the loss or reduction of lucrative trade with South Korea (just under 
US$200 billion in 2009?70 times China's trade volume with North Korea).66 
This policy course may be desirable if Chinese leaders conclude that the image of 
China "never giving in" on issues related to its own regional security interests is 
one of an insecure great power rather than one sufficiently enlightened to 
engender soft-power influence through mastering the art of occasional concession. 
China's middle-power neighbors will be less liable to cling to what Chinese 
66 Frank Ching, "Can China Keep its Balance in East Asia?", The Globe and Mail 
(Toronto), 1 June 2010. 
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policy analysts view as outmoded Cold War strategies if they feel less need to 
hedge or balance against a rising China that invariably assigns sovereign interest 
greater weight than "peaceful development" or regional harmony. 
In advancing this observation, it is noted that China's leaders will need to 
finesse such accommodation against the growth of popular nationalism within 
their country's various domestic factions. That acknowledged, however, the 
ongoing and substantial intensification of China's middle-power economic ties 
provides at least some leverage that the Chinese government can employ to 
balance its pursuit of normative diplomacy against nationalist sentiments at home 
and potential spillover for mutually working to resolve politico-strategic 
problems. Beyond the short-term imperative of defusing the Korean peninsula's 
latest crisis, Chinese leaders could increase their collaboration with their 
Australian and South Korean counterparts to identify and implement regional 
community-building. This includes establishing effective mechanisms for 
systematic consultations over what specific architectures will best facilitate Asia 
Pacific peace, stability and prosperity, and cooperating with Australia and South 
Korea to influence other regional and extra-regional actors to endorse them. 
Australia's policy-makers will need to convince their Chinese and Asian 
equivalents that their country's foreign policy can be pursued and adjusted in the 
ways required to avoid being perceived as merely an American proxy on critical 
regional security questions. Recent South Korean governments have undertaken 
this step more convincingly than their Australian opposite numbers. 
China faces a reciprocal obligation to negotiate its differences with the 
region's middle powers on their own merits, rather than yield to the temptation to 
regard any divisions that it may have with Canberra or Seoul as mere reflections 
of their US ties and a part of US and allied containment strategy directed toward 
China. Chinese policy-makers could work with their Australian and South Korean 
counterparts to advance a mutually shared vision of international order. While it is 
true that they hold different political values that inhibit a common perspective of 
what any such order should be, Chinese policy-makers nevertheless share with 
their Australian and South Korean equivalents a fundamental view about the 
value of market liberalism and the imperative of global stability. Collaborating to 
fight global terror, to maintain freedom of access to the world's major sea lanes 
and to confront such looming non-traditional security challenges as global 
pandemics, cyber warfare and climate change would underwrite mutual Chinese 
and Asia-Pacific middle-power security interests and help facilitate international 
security cooperation. 
The agenda confronting these three Asian trading partners is a formidable 
one. However, sufficient creativity, determination and good will apparently exist 
among them to meet looming and complex security challenges with mutual trust 
and understanding. If their policy leaders succeed in overcoming such security 
challenges, such an achievement could assist in achieving regional and global 
cooperation and stability. 
